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I. INTRODUCTION
Texas statutes do not properly protect the mentally retarded convicted
murderer from lethal injection, even though the United States Supreme
Court declared in Atkins v. Virginia1 that execution of persons with
mental retardation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.2 The Court held in Atkins that a national consensus
exists3 against executing persons who, despite meeting the law's standards
for criminal responsibility,4 possess certain developmental disabilities in
reasoning, impulse control, and judgment that indicate a diminished
moral culpability.5 The Court reasoned that in the thirteen years since it
affirmed the right of states to execute the mentally retarded in Penry v.
Lynaugh,6 a sufficient number of states outlawed such executions as to
create the national consensus, thus rendering the executions cruel and
unusual.7 Atkins did not, however, define mental retardation and instead
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that execution of mentally retarded
persons violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. Id. at 304, 307, 313-14. In declining to hold execution of mentally retarded persons
unconstitutional thirteen years earlier in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Court
noted that perhaps one day a national consensus of opinion against the practice could
persuade the Court to revisit its Eighth Amendment rationale; only Georgia and Maryland
at that time prohibited the practice in 1989. Sixteen states enacted similar bans in the
interim, including Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Washington. Id. at 314-15.
4. See id. at 306 (stating unequivocally that mentally retarded offenders who possess
criminal culpability "should be tried and punished").
5. See id. (explaining that mentally retarded offenders act with less culpability due to
their impairments).
6. Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry 1), 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (refusing to hold execution of
mentally retarded persons in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment). Justice O'Connor wrote that mental retardation may lessen the
offender's culpability as a mitigating factor, but no sufficient evidence existed to demon-
strate that mental retardation always indicates diminished culpability, and that no consen-
sus existed in the nation to suggest that practice was widely regarded as cruel and unusual.
Id.
7. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 316 ("The practice, therefore, has become truly unu-
sual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it.").
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directed states to enact their own methods for finding a defendant men-
tally retarded.8
Without statutory guidance, courts must make critical determinations
for adjudicating mental retardation claims, including: selection of an ac-
ceptable definition of mental retardation; whether to answer the question
of mental retardation before or after trial; and whether the court or the
jury should make the determination.9 Competing bills in the Texas legis-
lature have proposed a variety of answers that merit discussion. One bill
would require the jury to consider mental retardation among the several
aggravating special issues and mitigating circumstances it must weigh in
the guilt phase of the trial.10 Another bill relies on existing statutory
framework to permit a defendant to prove mental retardation prior to
8. See id. at 317 (anticipating differences of opinion regarding which mentally re-
tarded offenders possess diminished culpability to merit exemption from the death penalty;
therefore leaving "to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences" (quoting Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986))). In Ford, the Court held that execution of the insane vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 399; see also Schriro v. Smith, 126 S. Ct. 7 (2005)
(reaffirming its holding in Atkins v. Virginia that states must develop their own methods of
adjudicating claims of mental retardation, notwithstanding constitutional challenges to the
adopted procedures). The Court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, in which that court ordered Arizona to hold a post-conviction
jury trial for a convicted murderer alleging in his habeas corpus petition that he suffered
mental retardation and therefore could not be executed, because Arizona must be permit-
ted to develop its own statutory guidelines. Id.
9. See, e.g., Penry v. Texas (Penry 111), 178 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (hold-
ing that instruction to jury that if it did not find defendant mentally retarded, it should
weigh any other mitigating issues, reasonably precluded jurors from considering relevant
mitigating evidence of mental impairment because the words 'any other' could have misled
jurors to believe they should look to other issues); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004) (adopting the definition of mental retardation promulgated by the
American Association on Mental Retardation and prescribed by the Texas Health and
Safety Code § 591.003(13), denying the applicant's claimed right to a post-conviction jury
trial to determine mental retardation, holding that applicant had burden of proof to
demonstrate mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence, and that applicant
failed to prove mental retardation); Hall v. Texas, 160 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(affirming trial court determinations prior to and following the decision in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia that defendant was not mentally retarded and thus eligible for the death penalty); Ex
parte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that applicant's habeas
writ relied almost entirely on testimony from trial at which his mental retardation claim
was fully litigated, and therefore the habeas judge was not required to hold a live eviden-
tiary hearing to consider evidence of mental retardation).
10. See Tex. H.B. 419, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (proposing to amend the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure article 37.071 to require capital jury to answer in the punishment phase
whether convicted murderer is mentally retarded). Texas House Bill 419 did not receive a
hearing in 2005, but it passed the House in 2003 as Tex. H.B. 614, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
The Texas District and County Attorneys Association (TDCAA) drafted the bill. E-mail
from Shannon Edmonds, Director of Governmental Relations, TDCAA, to Graham
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trial in the same manner as a defendant asserting incompetence or in-
sanity. 1 The latter bill offers Texas the best chance to comport with
Atkins.
Without guidance by the Texas Legislature, the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals has been forced to offer leadership. The court, in Ex parte
Briseno,12 adopted a widely-accepted definition of mental retardation
and modified it with a number of evidentiary considerations which the
court regarded as probative in determining one's level of criminal culpa-
bility. 3 Ex parte Briseno upheld the trial court's authority to act as finder
of fact 4 to determine whether a defendant has proven his mental retar-
dation by a preponderance of the evidence.' 5 A defendant who claims
Baker, Candidate for Juris Doctor, 2007, St. Mary's University School of Law (Oct. 13,
2005, 13:54:00 CST) (on file with author).
11. See Tex. S.B. 231, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (proposing to create pretrial procedure in
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for the determination of mental retardation similar
to the current procedures for considering claims of insanity and incompetence). S.B. 231
has been refiled in the 80th Legislative Session as S.B. 249. Tex. S.B. 249, 80th Leg., R.S.
(2007).
12. 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ("Until the Texas Legislature provides an
alternative statutory definition of 'mental retardation' for use in capital sentencing, we will
follow the AAMR or section 159.003(13) criteria in addressing Atkins mental retardation
claims.").
13. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 5-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (providing gui-
dance to courts making a variety of dispositions on mental retardation claims for relief
under Atkins v. Virginia, ranging from the pretrial level to petitions for habeas relief); see
also Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624, 633 (Pa. 2005) (Eakin, J., concurring) (la-
menting the failure of Pennsylvania lawmakers to enact a definition of mental retardation);
cf Ex parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250, 251-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (guiding Texas courts
in determining sanity under Ford v. Wainwright when the Texas legislature had not yet
enacted a statute to enforce the United States Supreme Court prohibition against the exe-
cution of the insane).
14. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 11 n.42 (ruling against the applicant's claim
that he was entitled to a jury determination of mental retardation). The applicant asserted
that his mental retardation defense was analogous to a repealed Texas statute that pre-
scribed pretrial insanity procedure and thus warranted similar adjudication. Id. The Ohio
Supreme Court, similarly without statutory guidance on Atkins v. Virginia, ruled in favor of
a judicial determination of mental retardation in Ohio v. Lott, 779 N.E. 1011, 1015 (Ohio
2002), comparing the procedure to that state's existing method of competency determina-
tion in which the court, not the jury, is the factfinder. By contrast, Oklahoma's highest
criminal court held in Murphy v. Oklahoma, 54 P.3d 556, 558 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002),
absent statute to the contrary, the determination of mental retardation should be made by
the sentencing jury.
15. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 12 n.44 (holding that the defendant must
prove his mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence, likewise proposed by
Tex. H.B. 614, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), joining the company of Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
and Washington); see also Cross v. Texas, 446 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (holding
that capital murder defendant has burden to prove by preponderance of the evidence that
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exemption from the death penalty under Atkins must prove that his
mental retardation is sufficient to warrant a finding of diminished culpa-
bility.16 The result is a trial in which the defense attempts to convince the
jury that the retarded defendant lacks the cognitive ability to learn from
his mistakes, while the prosecutor uses the same evidence to explain why
this makes the defendant a future danger.' v The result is, therefore, ab-
surd: a mentally retarded defendant can be executed for being mentally
retarded if the fact finder concludes the evidence of impairment is aggra-
vating instead of mitigating. Therefore, it is critical that mental retarda-
tion be determined or ruled out in a pretrial setting. It should be noted
that the Texas legislature has recently amended the Penal Code to include
life without parole for convicted murderers.18 Thus, Texas can now per-
manently incapacitate a murderer, determined by the jury to be a future
danger, without execution.
This note proposes a satisfactory solution to the Atkins question by
demonstrating why a pretrial determination of mental retardation using
existing procedures for determinations of competency1 9 and sanity2° best
serves Texas criminal justice interests. This note examines key develop-
ments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Texas death penalty, and
current Texas law regarding offenders with impairments. Part II exam-
ines the holding in Atkins as well as subsequent developments in Texas
and federal courts. Part III reviews the federal and Texas death penalty
jurisprudence following the U.S. Supreme Court's ban on the death pen-
he was insane at time of offense did not deprive him of procedural or substantive due
process).
16. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305-18 (2002) (holding that mentally retarded
offenders, while perhaps knowing right from wrong, often cannot learn from mistakes,
reason logically, or control their impulses, and therefore their deficiencies diminish per-
sonal culpability).
17. See Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and
the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 349-50
(2002) (observing that juries can be forced to determine whether a piece of evidence is
mitigating, aggravating, or both).
18. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 2005) (creating a sentence of life
without parole sentence for persons convicted capital murderers, while removing the sen-
tence of life with the eligibility for parole). Defendants convicted of capital murder and
sentenced under the amended penal code, therefore, will be sentenced to lethal injection
or life without parole to ensure they will remain imprisoned for the balance of their lives.
Id.
19. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.005 (Vernon 2005) (determining
whether defendant is competent to proceed with trial).
20. See id. at art. 46C (repealing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.03 and estab-
lishing new procedures for the insanity defense). The new insanity defense procedures con-
form to the existing procedures for determining competency. Id; cf id. at art. 46B.005
(presenting the existing procedures for determining competency).
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alty in 1972,21 including an analysis of the several tests of the Texas death
penalty that focus on the jury instructions given in capital cases. Part IV
analyzes the current Texas statutes regarding findings of insanity and in-
competence in defendants and suggests how they might apply to the de-
termination of mental retardation. Finally, this note urges the Texas
legislature to act and offers suggestions that would ensure the state's jus-
tice system preserves the rights and dignity of bona fide mentally re-
tarded offenders without denying Texas citizens the expectation that
convicted murderers will be permanently incapacitated. 22
II. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
A. The Facts
Daryl Renard Atkins and a second defendant, William Jones, kid-
napped their victim, robbed him, drove him to an automated teller ma-
chine where they forced him to withdraw more money, then finally drove
him to a secluded location and shot him eight times. 23 The state indicted
both men for capital murder.2 4 Jones, however, escaped the death pen-
alty by agreeing to testify against Atkins.2 ' Each accused the other of
shooting the victim, and the jury believed Jones' story.26 A jury convicted
Atkins of armed robbery, abduction, and capital murder.27
In the penalty phase of his trial, Atkins relied solely on the testimony
of a forensic psychologist who concluded that Atkins suffered mild
mental retardation.28 The psychologist based his conclusion on a review
of school records, interviews with persons familiar with Atkins, and an
intelligence test indicating an IQ of fifty-nine.29 The state proved aggra-
21. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (holding that death penalty
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
amendments). Note that the Court consolidated two cases for its decision, the other being
Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), previously upheld by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals at Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) vacated in part, 408
U.S. 238 (1972) (affirming the death sentence for an African-American man convicted of
raping a widowed white woman).
22. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 2005).
23. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
24. Id. at 307 n.1.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 307-08.
27. Id. at 307.
28. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 309 n.3 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAG-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 42-43 (4th ed. 2000), available
at www.PsychiatryOnline.com, in which mild mental retardation is characterized in persons
with an IQ of 50-55 to 70).
29. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 308-09 (stating the procedures used by the
defense's psychologist to determine whether Atkins suffered mental retardation).
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vating factors: future dangerousness3 ° and the "vileness of the offense."31
Atkins' prior felony convictions and the testimony of his earlier robbery
victims demonstrated his future dangerousness. 32 The trial record in-
cluded photos of the deceased victim's body accompanied by the autopsy
report, thus illustrating the vileness component. 33 The jury sentenced At-
kins to death.34
At a second sentencing hearing following a procedural remand,35 the
psychologist testified again. Virginia this time offered an expert rebuttal
witness who disputed Atkins' claim of mental retardation.36 The State's
expert interviewed Atkins rather than administer an IQ test; he also re-
viewed the defendant's school records and spoke with Atkins' jailers.37
The State's expert stated that Atkins earned terrible grades in school not
because he was retarded but simply because he "chose to pay attention
sometimes, not to pay attention others, and did poorly because he did not
want to do what he was required to do."3 He concluded that Atkins
possessed at least average intelligence.39 Significantly, both experts testi-
fied that Atkins understood his conduct was criminal and that shooting
30. Id. at 308; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(1) (Vernon 2005)
(charging jurors in the punishment phase of a capital trial to consider whether "the defen-
dant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society"). Expert testimony may be considered to predict whether a person will, in the
future, continue to present a danger to society. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901
(1983).
31. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 308. Texas capital jurors typically do not receive a
special instruction on vileness, although a similar instruction remains in effect for murders
committed prior to Sept. 1, 1991. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711(b)(3)
(Vernon 2005) (charging jurors to consider whether the offense was unreasonable).
32. Atkins v. Virginia, '536 U.S. at 308.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 309.
35. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 456-57 (Va. 1999) (remanding for
new punishment phase trial because the state's jury verdict form did not allow jury to
impose a life sentence if the state failed to prove neither vileness nor future dangerousness
beyond a reasonable doubt).
36. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 309. The prosecution's expert, Dr. Stanton Same-
now, diagnosed antisocial personality disorder. Id.
37. Id. at 309 n.6.
38. Id.
39. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d, 323 (Hassell, J., dissenting) (quoting
prosecution's expert witness, Dr. Stanton Samenow, who found the defendant possessed
average intelligence). Dr. Samenow testified that in his interview with the defendant, At-
kins knew the Governor of Virginia's name and was aware that the son of former President
Kennedy died in an airplane. Id. at 322. Two judges dissented in the upholding of Atkins'
death sentence, declaring Dr. Samenow's testimony "incredulous as a matter of law." Id.
at 323. "It is common knowledge that many children as young as eight years old are capa-
ble of relating the same historical facts that the defendant described and possess a vocabu-
lary similar to the defendant's vocabulary." Id. at 324.
20071
THE SCHOLAR
his victim was wrong.4" The trial jury did not find that Atkins' IQ score
mitigated his culpability.4 1
Atkins appealed for commutation of his death sentence to life impris-
onment based on his mental retardation.4 2 Virginia did not then prohibit
execution of the mentally retarded;4 3 the State simply listed retardation
as one of several mitigating factors the jury could consider.4" Atkins ar-
gued that the Commonwealth had never executed anyone with an IQ
score as low as his.45 The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the argument,
unwilling to commute the death sentence "merely because of his IQ
score."4 6 The jury had already declined to find Atkins' low 10 a mitigat-
ing circumstance.4 7 "[I]t is the function of the factfinder, not this [clourt,
to determine the weight that should be accorded to expert testimony on
that issue," the court declared.4 8
40. Id. at 321 (majority opinion). The test of whether a defendant knew his conduct
was wrong is typical in tests for insanity. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon
1994) (providing an affirmative defense if mental defect or disease caused him to not know
his conduct was wrong, and stipulating that the defect cannot be manifested solely by con-
tinued criminal or antisocial conduct); United States v. Massa, 804 F.2d 1020, 1022-23
(E.D. Mo. 1986) (holding that a defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct if they
are insane "as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law" (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft 1962))). The Court reasoned that
mentally retarded offenders often understand right from wrong, but their impairments
render them less culpable (as opposed to the complete lack of culpability that accompanies
a finding of insanity). Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
41. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d at 320.
42. Id. at 318.
43. See Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry 1), 492 U.S. 302, 311-12 (1989) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment did not prohibit the execution
of mentally retarded offenders, but that juries must have the opportunity to contemplate
and give effect to a defendant's evidence of mental impairment that would merit a sen-
tence less than death).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (West 2005).
45. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d at 318. Dr. Evan Stuart Nelson, a forensic
clinical psychologist, assessed Atkins' 10 score at fifty-nine using the Wechsler Adult Intel-
ligence Scale-III (WAIS-III), indicating that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. See id.
at 319 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 40 (4th ed. 1994), available at www.PsychiatryOnline.com).
46. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d at 321.
47. See id. at 320 (citing precedent in Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 254, 268
(Va. 1991), in which a jury declined to find defendant's IQ score of seventy a mitigating
factor to warrant a lesser sentence).
48. See id. (relying on Saunders v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 39, 43 (Va. 1991)) to
uphold the decision of the jury to assign weight to the experts' testimony).
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B. The Holding
Execution of mentally retarded persons, under Penry I (1989), did not
violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment under the accepted standards at the time of the drafting of
the Constitution49 or under the evolving standards of decency test articu-
lated in Trop v. Dulles.5° Thirteen years later in Atkins, the Supreme
Court reversed its Penry I decision.51 Writing for the 6-3 majority,52 Jus-
tice Stevens wrote:
Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements
for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they
commit crimes. Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning,
judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act
with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious
adult criminal conduct. 53
Atkins did not prohibit states from holding mentally retarded offenders
criminally accountable; it removed from the available sentencing options
the most severe criminal sanction. 54 The Court reasoned that in the thir-
teen years since Penry I, the national consensus had shifted against execu-
tion of the mentally retarded. For evidence of the evolving national
49. See Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry 1), 492 U.S. 302, 330-33 (1989) (finding insufficient
cause to hold that execution of mentally retarded persons violates the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). Justice O'Connor wrote that "idiot"
and "lunatics," as recognized by the common law in 1789, would have been exempted from
the death penalty. Id. at 330. Those persons today, however, would be deemed either
insane and thus without moral blameworthiness or incompetent due to their lack of pre-
sent understanding of the proceedings against them. Id. at 332.
50. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment draws its meaning from the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"). Chief Jus-
tice Warren suggested that the word unusual could be distinguished from the word cruel
inasmuch as unusual would signify something not generally done. Id. at 101 n.32. In Penry
v. Lynaugh, Justice Scalia wrote that an Eighth Amendment inquiry must consider both
elements of cruel and unusual and therefore it is not enough to find the punishment cruel
without regard to society's approval. Penry 1, 492 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
51. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
52. See id. (voting to hold execution of the mentally retarded in violation of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment were Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.; dissenting were Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Scalia and Thomas, JJ).
53. Id. at 306.
54. See id. at 305.
55. See id. at 315-16 (indicating that the actions of state legislatures can measure na-
tional consensus); Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry 1), 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (noting that peti-
tioner cited in his brief only one state that had outlawed execution of the mentally
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consensus, the Court pointed to the consistent movement of state legisla-
tures against execution of the retarded.56 The practice, the Court held,
had become truly unusual, in the parlance of the Eighth Amendment,
and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Atkins did not rely on the national consensus argument alone. The
truly impaired offender, the Court reasoned, could not necessarily be de-
terred due to his inability to process information or control his conduct.58
Nor would the other rationale for the death penalty - retribution - serve
honorably where society puts to death "only the most deserving of execu-
tion, as opposed to murderers less culpable than others."59 Finally, there
retarded); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 n.2 (1986) (polling the national
consensus to determine that of the forty-one death-penalty states, none permitted the exe-
cution of the insane and twenty-six had explicit statutes requiring suspension of the execu-
tion of a legally incompetent person); Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Ex-
empt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911 (2001) (tracking
the development of a national consensus to exempt mentally retarded offenders from
execution).
56. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 314-16 (taking note of the eighteen states explicitly
prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, including Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and the
federal government). Justice Stevens wrote that the number of states was less significant
than the uniform direction of the states in prohibiting the practice. Id. at 315. Texas is one
of five states, joined by Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia, which executed
a person with an IQ of less than seventy in the same period in which sixteen states out-
lawed the practice. Id. at 316 n.20.
57. See id. at 316 n.21 (supporting the theory that the practice had become truly unu-
sual with a comparative recitation of widespread condemnation of the practice among re-
ligious organizations and professional groups associated with mental retardation, and the
world community); see also Christopher L. Chauvin, Atkins v. Virginia: How Flawed Con-
clusions Convert Good Intentions into Bad Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 473, 484-85 (2005).
58. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 320 (explaining that the mentally impaired of-
fender cannot be deterred, and that prohibition of the practice would not lessen the deter-
rent effect on unimpaired persons who could not, in any even, benefit from the
prohibitions); see generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 155 (1976) (explaining that
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes are permissible considerations for legislatures
to consider in whether the death penalty is appropriately imposed).
59. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 319 (explaining that the most severe form of
retribution is inappropriate where the offender's crime does not demonstrate "a conscious-
ness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder" (quoting God-
frey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)). Justice Stevens wrote that if the average
murderer's culpability does not merit execution, a mentally retarded offender must surely
be exempted. Id. at 319. Justice Scalia, however, assailed this presumption by insisting
that culpability and deservedness of severe retribution depends not so much upon the
mental capacity of the offender who can distinguish right from wrong, but also upon the
wickedness of the crime. See id. at 350-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, juries con-
tinue to send mentally retarded offenders to the death chamber for depraved crimes, prov-
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exists the risk that the truly impaired offender may be unable to persuade
the factfinder of his mitigating circumstances due to his inappropriate de-
meanor at trial, for example, or his eagerness to please by making a false
confession.6" In sum, the Court sought to protect truly mentally retarded
offenders from the risk "that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors which may call for a less severe penalty."61
Not all offenders who claim to suffer mental retardation, however, will
be impaired to the degree about which there exists the national consensus
of state legislatures. 62 Mental retardation manifests in degrees of sever-
ity. 63 Rather than hand down a broadly applicable clinical definition of
mental retardation, Atkins left to the states the task of defining and deter-
mining mental retardation in capital murder defendants.64 States must
individually determine whether to adopt an existing definition of mental
retardation from a handful of similar, accepted characterizations, or cre-
ing that society's moral outrage occasionally demands retarded offenders be executed. See
id. at 351; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (explaining that capital
punishment is, in part, an expression of the community's moral outrage at grossly offensive
conduct).
60. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 320-21 (explaining the particular susceptibility
of mentally retarded persons to make confessions regardless of their veracity); see also
Denis W. Keyes, William J. Edwards & Timothy J. Derning, Mitigating Mental Retardation
in Capital Cases: Finding the "Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 529, 532 (1998) (describing the vulnerabilities to which the mentally retarded are
susceptible, including becoming the scapegoat for an accomplice). But see Ex parte
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (declaring a reviewing court's deference
to trial court determinations on mental retardation upon collateral review, especially when
founded upon the defendant's credibility and demeanor).
61. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 320 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605
(1978)) (explaining that where the nature of the impairment prevents the defendant from
presenting his mitigating evidence of the impairment itself or otherwise assist himself in his
defense, greater care must be taken to ensure the trial procedure comports with the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Elaine Cassel, Justice Deferred, Justice Denied: The
Practical Effect of Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 51, 55 (2004) (explaining that
the criminal defense attorney must overcome the inclination of the judge and the jury to
disregard expert psychological testimony and instead trust their instincts or their "gut feel-
ing" about the defendant's impairment and level of culpability).
62. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 317.
63. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (explaining
that persons with mental retardation "range from those whose disability is not immediately
evident to those who must be constantly cared for").
64. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 317 (relying on its earlier decision in Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986), to direct states to adopt their own methods of
ensuring that mentally retarded offenders have the opportunity to present their legal issue
of exemption from the death penalty in a constitutionally permissible manner).
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ate their own, either from whole cloth or by augmenting the present
definitions.65
C. First Impressions in Ex parte Briseno
Defendant Jose Garcia Briseno appealed his death sentence for the
1991 murder of the Dimmit County sheriff, alleging that he suffered
mental retardation and thus was ineligible for the death penalty under
Atkins.66 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals took judicial notice of the
fact that while Atkins declared a national consensus against executing
mentally retarded offenders, the Texas legislature had not enacted legisla-
tion to illuminate the state's position on the consensus.67 Nevertheless, in
the face of mounting writs by condemned murderers following Atkins, the
Ex parte Briseno court offered its own clear guidelines for courts to em-
ploy in addressing habeas claims under Atkins.68
Ex parte Briseno used the definition established by the American Asso-
ciation of Mental Retardation (AAMR), which is codified for use by
Texas' state social services.6 9 The AAMR characterizes mental retarda-
tion as: 1) significant subaverage intellectual functioning, 2) accompanied
by deficiencies in adaptive functioning, all of which 3) occur prior to age
18.70 Ex parte Briseno specifically declined to endorse as a long-term so-
lution, however, the AAMR definition as a bright-line rule to exempt a
category of offenders that would inevitably affect persons just over or
under a particular IQ.71
65. See id. (granting states the freedom to devise or adopt a definition of mental
retardation, including a definition that considers the defendant's culpability in relation to
his impairment).
66. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3dl at 5 n.8 (indicating the court's prior experience
with providing pre-legislative guidance to the courts in the wake of a Supreme Court prohi-
bition of the death penalty for persons not competent to be executed under Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (citing Ex parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988))).
67. Id. at 5n.9 (judicially establishing procedural guidelines and substantive standards
for examining Atkins claims "[iun the absence of a statutory framework to determine
mental retardation" (quoting Ohio v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002))).
68. See id. at 5 n.7 (noting the court had remanded thirty-five writs applications to
convicting courts because the applicant made a prima facie showing of the possibility of
mental retardation).
69. See id. at 5 n.7 (acknowledging previous use of American Association on Mental
Retardation definition for mental retardation in Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.3d 57, 60-61
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997), cert. granted on other grounds sum nom. Tennard v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 945 (2003)).
70. See American Association for Mental Retardation, Definition of Mentally Re-
tarded, http://www.aamr.org/Policies/pdf/definitionofMR.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2006)
(explaining the philosophy behind the AAMR's generally accepted definition).
71. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6.
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Ex parte Briseno instead focused attention on the culpability of defend-
ants who just barely slip into the accepted definitions of mental retarda-
tion.72 The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), for example, classifies eighty-
five percent of mentally retarded persons as only mildly mentally re-
tarded. 73 Because the DSM-IV indicates that persons diagnosed early
with mild mental retardation may learn sufficient adaptive skills to no
longer warrant the mental retardation diagnosis, the Ex parte Briseno
court suggested that the clinical definitions cast a wide net to render more
people eligible for social services in the knowledge that persons on the
borderline of a mental retardation diagnosis have the best hope for suc-
cessful treatment and improvement.74
The court questioned more than the bright-line IQ test. Experts testi-
fying on either side may offer sharply different views of the defendant's
adaptive skills and his ability to function in the community, notwithstand-
ing an IQ test that by itself resolves little.75 The Briseno court suggested
that the court remedy the subjective nature of the state's current health-
care-based definition of mental retardation by adding objective questions
related to the criminal conduct at issue.7 6 In particular, the defendant in
72. See id. at 8 (expressing doubt that the same definition of mental retardation that is
used for providing psychological assistance, social services, and financial aid is appropriate
for use in criminal trial to decide whether execution of a particular person would be consti-
tutionally excessive punishment). The court expressed its belief, too, that most Texans
would agree that John Steinbeck's character Lennie, "by virtue of his lack of reasoning
ability and adaptive skills" should be exempt from capital punishment. Id. at 6 n.19 (refer-
ring to JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN (1937)). More curiously, the court does not
mention Boo Radley. See HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
73. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5 n.14 (citing to AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000), availa-
ble at www.PsychiatryOnline.com.
74. See id. at 6 (refusing to embrace a broad clinical definition as a suitable definition
for factfinders to use in determining mental retardation and the mentally retarded of-
fender's culpability); see also Jonathan Bing, Note, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from
Capital Punishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 67-68 (1996) (demonstrating how advocacy organiza-
tions determine the clinical definition of mental retardation by explaining that "[r]aising
the IQ level to [seventy-five], according to the AAMR, would have increased the number
of false positives, while reducing the number to [sixty-five] may have denied services to
those who needed them").
75. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9 (explaining that determination of mental
retardation can, and likely will, involve a battle of experts).
76. See id.; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(13) (Vernon 2005) (defin-
ing mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is
concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental pe-
riod"). The definition is more typically used to determine a social service applicant's quali-
fications for assisted living or state institutional care. See, e.g., id. at § 591.001.
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Ex parte Briseno proposed that the factfinder consider the defendant's
leadership skills, his ability to plan and execute the crime, or whether he
can or did lie to cover up the crime.77
The objective questions proposed by the defendant in Ex parte Briseno
assume that one aspect of cognitive ability is indicative of normal intelli-
gence, as opposed to considering whether the mental retardation contrib-
uted to the commission of the act or prevented the offender from
resisting the act.78 The Atkins prohibition on execution is met when the
defendant proves mental retardation.79 Whether the defendant could
successfully plan and execute his crime or knew right from wrong cannot
be dispositive of whether he is retarded; Atkins acknowledged that men-
tally retarded offenders can understand right from wrong and that they
can be competent to stand trial.8" Their impairments, however, render
them unable to understand or process information; they often cannot suf-
ficiently or accurately communicate, reason logically, or draw inferences
and learn from their mistakes.81 A subsequent Supreme Court holding
clarifies that Atkins did not require the defendant to prove that mental
retardation caused the act.82
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY
A. Procedural Remedies Resuscitate Death Penalty
Modern death penalty jurisprudence emerged in 1972 with Furman v.
Georgia3 when the Supreme Court halted the death penalty by a 5-4
*84Bmargin. Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote that the death penalty
was unconstitutional because it violated evolving standards of decency 5
77. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9 (proposing objective questions related to
the offense as indicators of criminal culpability).
78. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft 1962) (weighing whether of-
fender, a the time of his alleged conduct, and as a result of mental defect or disease, lacked
the substantial capacity either understand the wrongfulness of his act or to conduct himself
lawfully).
79. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (holding the mentally retarded
offender less culpable as a matter of law).
80. Id. at 318.
81. Id.
82. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) ("Nothing in [Atkins] suggested
that a mentally retarded individual must establish a nexus between her mental capacity and
her crime before the Eight Amendment prohibition on executing her is triggered.").
83. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that death penalty "would con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
amendments").
84. Id.
85. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion) (re-
versing a lower military court martial sentence to deport and denationalize a dishonorably
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and failed to deliver stated penological goals of retribution and deter-
rence.86 A plurality of the Court, however, found that the death penalty,
levied without guidance to juries, exposed defendants to a random chance
of death and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. 87 Thus, the 5-4
vote hinged not on substantive grounds abhorring the death penalty alto-
gether, but on procedural grounds that could be remedied.88
Thirty-four states set to work tweaking their death penalty statutes. 89
A handful of states created a list of crimes for which the death penalty
would be mandatory, eliminating the relevance of mitigating evidence. 9°
Such automatic death sentences did not long survive. 91 Most states en-
acted statutes requiring juries to find aggravating circumstances that war-
ranted a death sentence.92 Finally, the judge or jury would weigh the
aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether to execute. 93
charged soldier). Chief Justice Warren explained that the Eighth Amendment must "draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing
society." Id. at 101. Trop v. Dulles based its reasoning on Weems v. United States. Id. at
100-01. Weems declared the Eighth Amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete, but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
86. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 242-45 (critiquing two justifications for the
death penalty).
87. Id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id.
at 310-14 (White, J., concurring).
88. Shannon D. Gilreath, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Eighth Amendment
as a Mandate for Human Dignity: Another Look at Original Intent 12 (Wake Forest Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 03-12, 2003), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=413121.
89. JAN GbRECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION
15 (1983). When Furman v. Georgia came down on June 29, 1972, Texas had forty-five
persons on death row and another seven in county jails awaiting transfer. Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Death Row Facts, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/drowfacts.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2006). Governor Preston Smith commuted all of their sentences to life
and cleared death row in March 1973. Id.
90. JAN GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION
15 (1983).
91. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating mandatory death sen-
tence scheme that required jurors to ignore their oaths and choose a lesser offense not
necessarily indicative of the crime in order to spare a defendant from the death penalty);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating mandatory death sentences
in favor of individualized sentencing that considers the offender's circumstances as well as
the crime).
92. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 356 (1976) (striking down the state's
mandatory death sentence for want of a sentencing proceeding by which the sentencing
authority may concentrate on the sentence and weigh some or all mitigating and aggravat-
ing circumstances).
93. But see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that a jury, and not the
judge, must determine the aggravating factors that enhance a sentence because they oper-
ate "as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense" and therefore, the
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In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court voted 7-2 to permit states to levy the
death penalty once again with Gregg v. Georgia,94 upholding state stat-
utes that provided guidance to jurors.95 The Court held that public opin-
ion favored the death penalty.96
Sixth Amendment demands the aggravating factors be determined by a jury). Whether a
jury must determine a defendant's claim of mental retardation under Virginia v. Atkins
given the holding in Ring v. Arizona has been a subject of debate. Because the Supreme
Court has stated that Ring v. Arizona is not retroactive, habeas applicants seeking relief
from bench decisions denying mental retardation have not prevailed by that path. See, e.g.,
In re Woods, 155 F.App'x 132 (5th Cir. 2005) (permitting successive habeas petition relat-
ing to mental retardation claim, but denying relief under Ring v. Arizona because that
decision did not apply retroactively where no new constitutional rule was announced);
Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2003) (holding that a mental retardation claim, contrary
to an aggravating circumstance, is a means by which the defendant may seek to limit appli-
cation of death penalty even in the presence of the statutory elements for the crime and the
penalty). However, some observers believe that Ring v. Arizona could be interpreted to
mean that any determination made by the factfinder constitutes a "functional equivalent"
of a an aggravating element to a crime, in which case the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial, as well as the state's burden to demonstrate the elements beyond a reasonable doubt
would apply. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITv L. REP. 11, 11-19 (2003); Christo-
pher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR
Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2005) (observing that, if Ring v.
Arizona is held to apply to mental retardation, the prosecution would have to demonstrate
that the defendant was not retarded beyond a reasonable doubt). Besides the Ring v. Ari-
zona justification, the Eighth Amendment can also be demonstrated to require the govern-
ment to prove the absence of mental retardation to a jury on a case-by-case basis. See
Stephen B. Brauerman, Balancing the Burden: The Constitutional Justification for Requir-
ing the Government to Prove the Absence of Mental Retardation Before Imposing the Death
Penalty, 54 Am. U. L. REV. 401 (2004) (arguing that the Constitution requires the state to
prove to a jury the absence of retardation beyond a reasonable doubt before sentencing
the defendant to death).
94. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reestablishing the right of states to levy the death penalty two
years after prohibiting it).
95. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reinstating the death penalty in the United
States through the Court's finding that limited statutory guidance regarding sentencing
factors protected the due process rights of defendants); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 272-73 (1976) (upholding the Texas capital punishment scheme, reasoning that the
second special issue related to future dangerousness permits the jury to consider the defen-
dant's mitigating evidence and, therefore, Texas' first death penalty statute following
Furman v. Georgia satisfied the Court's prior determination that a jury be allowed to con-
sider mitigating evidence); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1976) (finding the Florida
death penalty statute constitutional over petitioner's objections that the enumerated miti-
gating and aggravating circumstance jury instructions are vague, broad, and merely cos-
metic to the issue of permitting a jury to consider a lesser sentence).
96. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 n.25 (1976) (citing public opinion polls
indicating that nearly sixty percent of the nation supported capital punishment).
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B. Texas Trial and Error
Texas opted for something that looked similar to jury discretion, but
the state declined to include instructions for the consideration of any mit-
igating factors during the penalty phase.9 7 The charge required jurors to
answer three yes-or-no questions-known as special issues-related to 1)
the deliberateness of the crime; 2) whether the defendant killed in re-
sponse to provocation; and 3) the offender's future dangerousness. 98 Af-
firmative answers to all three special issues condemned the defendant.9 9
1. Penry I
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Texas' capital
sentencing process because it included no mitigation instruction. 00
Johnny Paul Penry in 1979 raped and murdered a young woman in her
east Texas home. 10 1 Penry allegedly told police that he plunged a pair of
scissors into her chest so that she could not identify him.10 2 She lived
long enough to do so, and when police arrested him, prosecutors said,
Penry initially fabricated a cover story about the cuts he received during
the struggle with his victim. °3
Penry relied on Ford v. Wainwright,"°4 to argue that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against execution of the mentally incompetent
97. See TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, MINIMIZING RISK: A BLUEPRINT FOR DEATH
PENALTY REFORM IN TEXAS 94-95 (2005) (noting the lack of jury instruction to consider
mitigating evidence).
98. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711(2)(b)-(c) (Vernon 2004) (remain-
ing in effect for defendants accused of committing a capital murder prior to Sept. 1, 1991).
99. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 272-73 (reasoning that the second special issue
related to future dangerousness permits the jury to consider the defendant's mitigating
evidence and, therefore, Texas' first death penalty statute following Furman v. Georgia
satisfied the Court's prior determination that a jury be allowed to consider mitigating evi-
dence); see also Shelley Clarke, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas' Capital
Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEX. L. REV. 407, 425 (1990) (comparing the
Court's death-penalty jurisprudence to the tale of Goldilocks and the three bears: "com-
plete discretion is too arbitrary [Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)], no discretion is
just as bad [Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976)], but guided discretion is just right [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)].)
100. Penry v. Lynaugh, (Penry 1) 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (declaring Texas' death-penalty
procedure void because it failed to give the jury a vehicle to consider and give effect to
mitigating factors presented by the defendant).
101. Id. at 307.
102. Id.
103. See Interview with Lee Hon, Polk County Assistant Dist. Attorney, in Living-
ston, Tex. (Oct. 6, 2005). Hon prosecuted Penry in 2002. See id.
104. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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should extend to the mentally retarded.' °5 The Court disagreed, holding
that the Eighth Amendment, upon its drafting, contemplated only the
most severe mental defects of the mind and thereby declining to create a
new rule.10 6 The Court instead concluded that mental retardation should
have been a mitigating factor.10 7 The jury could not give effect to the
mitigating evidence, however, without discounting the state's powerful
evidence of Penry's future dangerousness in its answer to the second spe-
cial issue. 108 Prosecutors explained how Penry's inability to learn from
his mistakes, among other behavioral and cognitive deficits, meant that
he would continue to pose a danger to society at large or, in the prison
environment, to his guards, nurses, and fellow inmates.10 9 The Court
voided Texas' death penalty procedure for its failure to give the jury the
opportunity to express its "reasoned moral response" in its life-or-death
deliberations. 10°
105. See Penry 1, 492 U.S. at 328-30 (declining to apply the Eighth Amendment to
mentally retarded persons as a prohibition against the execution of a certain class of per-
sons (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986))).
106. See id. 331-32 (reciting common-law treatment of 'idiots' and 'lunatics' as under-
stood by the drafters of the Eighth Amendment meant people so completely divorced from
normal senses that today they would be recognized as insane or incompetent, and the
Framers did not recognize anything similar to what is understood today as mental retarda-
tion); Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and the
Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 345-46
(2002) (explaining that because the Framers could not have addressed the undiagnosed
condition of mental retardation at the drafting the Eighth Amendment, the discussion
shifts to whether "evolving standards of decency" will prohibit what was possible then).
107. See Penry I, 492 U.S. at 337 (recognizing that mentally retarded persons do not
act with the same level of culpability as persons of average intellect and capacity because of
serious limitations in such areas as cognitive impairment, impulse control, moral reasoning,
and cause and effect); see also Nebraska v. Hall, 25 N.W.2d 918, 927 (Neb. 1964) (reducing
the defendant's death sentence to life in prison because the defendant was a "low-grade
moron or a high-grade imbecile, passive in nature, possessed of a disposition to follow the
lead of others," about whom the court believed society had no interest in executing).
108. See Penry 1, 492 U.S. at 322 (rejecting the prosecution's assertion that the jury
could assess and give effect to the mitigating evidence when answering the special issues).
109. Id. 323-24 (describing the two-edged sword that Penry's mental retardation
presented to the jury).
110. See id. at 319 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)) (holding that the sentence determined in the penalty stage should consider
the defendant's character and background as well as the crime); cf. Barclay v. Florida, 463
U.S. 939 (1983) (holding that consideration of the State's non-statutory aggravating factors
would not violate the United States Constitution if the State established at least one statu-
tory aggravating factor).
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2. Penry H
Texas adopted a new capital jury charge based on the Court's discus-
sion in Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I) that suggested there would be no con-
stitutional infirmity in directing a jury to simply nullify a death-penalty
verdict by answering "no" to a special issue on aggravating circumstances
that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Jurors at Penry's
retrial received the new instruction directing them to voice their approval
of mitigating evidence by answering "no" to one of the special issues:
If you find that there are any mitigating circumstances in this case,
you must decide how much weight they deserve, if any, and there-
fore, give effect and consideration to them in assessing the defen-
dant's personal culpability at the time you answer the special issue.
If you determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if
any, that a life sentence, as reflected by a negative finding to the
issue under consideration, rather than a death sentence, is an appro-
priate response to the personal culpability of the defendant, a nega-
tive finding should be given to one of the special issues.'1 2
The Supreme Court held this instruction unconstitutional in Penry's
second appearance.'1 3 Rather than provide a means for the jury to weigh
mitigating evidence against aggravating circumstances and recommend a
sentence less than death, the Court held, the instruction called for jurors
to artificially contradict an otherwise affirmative response to any given
special issue in order to short-circuit a death sentence." 4 This meant a
jury that found the state's evidence persuasive in all of the special issues
regarding aggravating circumstances had to determine which special issue
it would answer falsely in order to give effect to mitigating evidence." 5
Jurors who believed they had a legal and moral responsibility to answer
the aggravating special issues truthfully could be dissuaded from making
111. See id. at 326-27 (reasoning that a statutory nullification instruction could satis-
factorily give jurors the necessary discretion to give effect to a defendant's mitigating evi-
dence). But see Shelley Clarke, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas' Capital
Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEX. L. Rav. 407, 463 (1990) (predicting that
a statutory nullification instruction "is surely the sort of minimal D-minus 'solution' that
could sail through the legislature").
112. Penry v. Johnson (Penry 11), 532 U.S. 782, 790-91 (2001).
113. Penry 11, 532 U.S. 782.
114. See id. at 797-98 (holding that the Texas response to Penry v. Lynaugh failed to
give the jury a more meaningful and substantive procedure with which to give its full,
intended effect to the mitigating evidence).
115. See id. at 798-99 (explaining that the jury nullification instruction placed law-
abiding jurors in an untenable situation).
2007]
THE SCHOLAR
a false answer to one of the questions even if it believed the defendant
should be spared.116
3. Penry III and Mitigation Today
Texas capital juries currently answer two special issues related to future
dangerousness1 17 and whether the death was actually caused by the de-
fendant," 8 taking into account aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. 119 The jury charge to consider mitigating factors directs jurors to
weigh the circumstances of the offense:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the
circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and back-
ground, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is
a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole rather than a death
sentence be imposed. 2°
Prior to Atkins, the Court required that mentally retarded defendants
be permitted to offer their mental retardation only as a mitigating fac-
tor.121 This approach did not have the intended affect of shielding men-
tally retarded defendants from the death penalty. Instead, a skilled
prosecutor before an angry jury can portray mental retardation as an ag-
gravating circumstance.122 For example, when Walter Bell, Jr. asserted
116. Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and
the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 349-50
(2002) (explaining that the instruction leaves the jury to question whether it can falsify its
answers to the special issues proven beyond reasonable doubt yet still justifiably believe it
is bound legally and morally to answer truthfully the questions posed); see also Theodore
Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1993) (analyzing jury survey data to conclude that confusion
exists regarding the weight that should be given mitigating and aggravating circumstances).
117. TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (Vernon 2005).
118. Id. at art. 37.071(2)(b)(2).
119. Id. at art. 37.071(2)(d)(1).
120. Id. at art. 37.071(2)(e)(1).
121. See Penry I, 492 U.S. at 327-28.
122. See, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288-89 (2004) (holding that reasonable
jurists could have used the evidence of Tennard's low IQ as an aggravating effect in weigh-
ing his future dangerousness, and not just as a matter of likely inference from the evidence
but because the prosecutor instructed them to do so); see also Michael Perlin, The Sanist
Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of "Mitigating" Mental Disability
Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. PoL'Y 239 (1994) (arguing that the mitigat-
ing evidence causes jurors to distrust mental disability evidence and they are treated more
harshly); but cf Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (permitting jury to consider non-
statutory aggravating factors if the state established at least one statutory aggravating
factor).
[Vol. 9:237
A PROPOSAL TO THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE
his mental retardation in his capital murder trial, the Jefferson County
prosecutor told the jury:
What did the doctors and counselors tell you about mental retarda-
tion or people that were on the border? ... Well, they cause more
trouble. They adjust to life on the outside [with] more difficulty...
and they are more susceptible to be led into committing more
crimes. So, if you believe [Bell] is mentally retarded, you have to
believe that, too. Folks, you have to believe that somewhere down
the road he's going to snap again.
123
Before Atkins, Bell was sentenced to death, but following Atkins, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals commuted Bell's sentence to life in
prison.
1 24
Atkins interrupted Penry's third sentencing trial.12 5 Despite Penry's
claim of mental retardation, prosecutors urged that his clear thinking,
premeditation, and attempts to deceive officers disproved Penry's
claim.126 The Penry III court instructed the jury "that mental retardation
is a mitigating factor as a matter of law.",1 27 The court instructed the jury
that if it found the defendant mentally retarded, it should answer "yes" to
the mitigation issue.128 If the jury did not find mental retardation, the
court explained, it was to "consider whether any other mitigating circum-
stance" existed.12 9 The jury answered "no" to both; Penry again received
the death sentence.
130
Far removed from the day of Jurek v. Texas when a defendant had
practically no favorable instruction to rely upon,131 today's Eighth
123. See David Pasztor, 28 Years on Death Row, Still Alive, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Nov. 24, 2003, at Al (quoting Jefferson County prosecutor in his closing argument in Wal-
ter Bell's capital murder trial in 1994).
124. Ex parte Bell, 152 S.W.3d 103, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam).
125. Penry v. Texas (Penry III), 178 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
126. Interview with Lee Hon, Polk County Assistant Dist. Attorney, in Livingston,
Tex. (Oct. 6, 2005). Hon's team, who prosecuted Penry in 2002, told the jury that Penry
had watched his victim's house for two weeks after helping deliver an appliance to her
home. Id. He gained entry to her home, Hon said, by claiming to have returned to be sure
everything was in working order. Id. Prosecutors told the jury that he confessed to killing
her so that she could not identify him. Id. Additionally, he explained away a fresh wound
by concocting a story about a bicycle accident before later confessing to being injured in
the struggle. Id. According to Hon, Penry's planning, execution, and fabrication refute
mental retardation. Id.




131. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 272-73 (upholding the Texas capital punishment
scheme, reasoning that the second special issue related to future dangerousness permits the
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Amendment jurisprudence considers what the jury mistakenly "could
have understood., 132 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Penry III
reversed and remanded for a new trial on penalty due to the reasonable
likelihood that the jury believed that once it had rejected mental retarda-
tion, the "any other" language of the jury instruction precluded giving
effect to other mental impairments in the defendant's favor.1 3 3 Under
Texas code, the court will not reverse the trial court "unless the error
appearing from the record is calculated to injure the rights of the defen-
dant, or unless it appears that the defendant has not had a fair and impar-
tial trial.' ' 134 The court held the instruction was "calculated to injure the
rights of the defendant.' 135
Judge Cochran, who had previously authored the Ex parte Briseno ma-
jority opinion, issued a scathing dissent. 136 Cochran acknowledged the
possibility that the jury could have believed it was precluded from consid-
ering Penry's mental impairments as mitigating evidence once it had de-
cided against mental retardation, but she did not find it reasonably
likely.137 To hold it reasonably likely that the jury did not understand its
charge, Cochran wrote, "requires one to assume that they were all men-
tally slow.' 138 The trial court's attempt to conform to Atkins via penalty-
phase special issue failed.
jury to consider the defendant's mitigating evidence even if no such explanation was forth-
coming from the trial court).
132. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1990) (explaining the Court's re-
cent inquiries and proposed tests related to jury deliberations, including what a jury "could
have understood the charge as meaning" (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16
(1985)), or what a juror "'could' have done or what he 'would' have done" (quoting Cali-
fornia v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987)), to whether the jury "'could have' drawn an imper-
missible interpretation from the trial court's instructions" or whether there exists the
"substantial possibility that a jury misunderstood its charge" (quoting Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367, 375-76, 377 (1988))).
133. See Penry III, 178 S.W.3d at 785 (explaining that, in light of the overwhelming
jurisprudence disfavoring confusing or reasonably misunderstood jury instructions, the trial
court's attempt to conform to Atkins failed to protect Penry's Eighth Amendment right to
have both his mental retardation legal question and mental impairment fact questions con-
sidered distinctly).
134. Id. at (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.19).
135. Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CFIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.19).
136. See id. at 789 (Cochran, J., dissenting) (writing for Keller, P.J., and Keasler and
Hervey, JJ.).
137. See id. at 795 (Cochran, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between the possible and
the reasonably likely).
138. See Penry III, 178 S.W.3d at 797 (Cochran, J., dissenting).
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IV. DETERMINING MENTAL STATE IN TEXAS
Current jurisprudence recognizes three doctrines under which the capi-
tal defendant's mental status may be examined: insanity, competence,
and mental retardation. 139 Texas provides statutory guidance regarding a
defendant's claim of insanity or incompetence. Mental retardation does
not yet enjoy such status. An examination of the other two illustrates how
the legislature could respond to Atkins.
A. Insanity
In contrast to competence and mental retardation, insanity is an excul-
patory defense; the defendant who proves insanity is typically acquit-
ted.140 The insanity defense inquires into the defendant's state of mind at
the time of the murder.' To prove his insanity, the defendant must
show that he did not know "the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong." '142 This so-called M'Naghten test was the standard for insanity
for more than a century, and it remains the foundation of the insanity
defense, but modern scholarship suggests that certain mentally ill defend-
ants may understand their crimes at some intellectual level yet remain
unable to conform their behavior to the law. 143
Because the defendant, due to mental defect, could not have purpose-
fully formed the criminal state of mind for criminal responsibility to at-
tach to the defendant, punishment serves no useful purpose.1
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the insane offender can-
139. See Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment
and the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 329
(2002) (delineating three mental conditions recognized in the law as diminishing a person's
blameworthiness or present accountability).
140. See id. at 329-30 (reciting historical precedent for society's interests in recogniz-
ing the insanity defense).
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft 1962).
142. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 608 n.3 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843)). "[T]o establish a defence [sic] on the ground
of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused as laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
143. See id. at 608 n.3 (explaining the development of the rule of "irresistible impulse"
to augment M'Naghten, whereby a defendant may be somehow powerless to obey the law
and conform his conduct to the law even when he knows the conduct is unlawful).
144. Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and




not be effectively deterred in the mentally ill state or even be held
culpable.
1 4 5
The Texas legislature reformed the insanity defense statute in 2005,
conforming the process used by experts to determine sanity to the stan-
dards used in determining competency. The legislature also strengthened
the post-acquittal procedures for persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity by including specific release standards regarding post-release
monitoring under the watch of the criminal court system.146 The same
expert may be appointed to perform both analyses and submit separate
reports on the issues. 147 The code requires the finder of fact, as deter-
mined by the defendant, to consider whether the prosecution has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the act alleged,
and whether the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that he was insane during the commission of the act. 148 A finding
of "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI) results in acquittal. 149 A
defendant found NGRI of a violent crime remains in the jurisdiction of
the court despite acquittal for a period that cannot exceed the maximum
period the defendant could have been sentenced had he been
convicted. 150
Neither the court nor any party may tell the jury of the consequences
to the defendant following an NGRI acquittal.15' At least one commen-
tator has suggested that this proscription prejudices the jury against the
defense.' 52 While it is no doubt true that jurors may wonder what will
become of the defendant who wins an NGRI acquittal, the evidence of
145. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (holding that a death penalty
that cannot deter or exact retribution due to the defendant's incapacity can only cause "the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering" and is therefore unconstitu-
tional (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977))); see also Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (explaining that capital punishment serves as a deterrent
only when the murder is the product of premeditation and deliberation).
146. TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 46C.158 (Vernon 2005).
147. Id. at art. 46C.103.
148. Id. at art. 46C.153.
149. Id. at art. 46C.155.
150. Id. at art. 46C.158. This raises the question of whether a person charged with
capital murder may be confined for life in an institutional setting without adjudication to
determine guilt. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 2005) (creating a sentence
of life without parole sentence for persons convicted capital murderers, while removing the
sentence of life with the eligibility for parole). But cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563 (1975) (holding there exists no constitutional basis for confining mentally ill persons
involuntarily if they are not dangerous and can live independently).
151. TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 46C.154 (Vernon 2005).
152. See Alison J. Meyers, Comment, Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded Defendants
in Texas May Get a Chance at Justice; Recommendations to the Task Force Created by Tex.
S.B. 553, 7th Leg., R.S. (2001), 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1233, 1256-57 (2002) (advocating Texas'
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this is admittedly not conclusive. 153 It is possible that jurors often believe
that institutionalization is insufficient. It is equally possible that jurors
are more easily moved toward NGRI acquittal when reassured that the
violent offender will remain in the jurisdiction of the court during the
institutionalization for as long as the court could imprison him.154
B. Competence
While insanity examines the defendant's state of mind at the commis-
sion of the crime, the question of competence asks whether the defendant
can understand the trial proceedings and aid in his own defense. 155
Therefore, the defendant who is unable or unwilling to plead insanity
may have his competence considered as a legal issue.15 6 The inquiry into
one's competence finds root in the Constitution's due process require-
ments as well as the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. 157 If the
defendant cannot aid his attorney in his defense, the court may never
adoption of the American Bar Association recommendation that courts inform jurors of
the consequences of their verdicts).
153. See id. (suggesting the possibility that juries fear the imminent release of the
mentally ill offender); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion:
Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) (quantifying juror
concern about the mentally ill offender's future dangerousness).
154. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46C.158 (Vernon 2005). Because the
Texas legislature has enacted life without parole, it is theoretically possible that a person
deemed violent or dangerous could live the balance of his life in a mental institution, under
the jurisdiction of the criminal courts, without trial. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31
(Vernon 2005) (creating a sentence of life without parole sentence for persons convicted
capital murderers, while removing the sentence of life with the eligibility for parole). But
cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
155. See Roberta M. Harding, "Endgame": Competency and the Execution Of Con-
demned Inmates-A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against the
Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 105, 109-13
(1994) (explaining the historical foundations behind society's generally held belief that it is
uncharitable to dispatch an offender into another world (quoting Ford v. Wainwright 477
U.S. 399, 407 (1986))).
156. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (reversing conviction where defen-
dant's evidence of competence was not given sufficient weight during trial, but declining to
order the trial court to reconsider upon retrial evidence of whether defendant was compe-
tent at his first trial because the test consider sufficient present ability); see Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) ("[Tihe test [for competency] must be whether he
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding ... and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.") (alteration in original).
157. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky
and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993) (explaining the application of modern clinical
competence determinations in criminal defendants).
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learn of potentially exculpatory evidence. 158 Second, if the defendant
does not understand the case against him or is otherwise impaired, the
punishment loses both its moral force and its deterrent effect.1 5 9 An in-
competent defendant may not be executed.
160
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure guides the trial court in deter-
minations of a defendant's competence. 16' Any party, including the
court, may raise the issue of competence at any time.'6 2 The Code's pro-
visions include a pre-trial hearing of competency before the defendant's
choice of the trial judge or a jury.1 63 The jury must be different from the
jury seated for the guilt phase. 164 The Code makes provision for court-
appointed expert evaluation and the affirmation of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment 65 right against compelled self-incrimination regarding the
defendant's statements during the evaluation.
66
Interestingly, the Code already contemplates mental retardation inas-
much as it instructs the examining expert to consider whether the defen-
dant has mental illness or mental retardation and whether the affliction
affects his ability to aid in his defense. 167 A person who is determined
incompetent may be released on bail or committed to a mental health
facility, including a maximum-security facility for violent offenders, for
restoration of competency. 168 When the defendant eventually is returned
to court following completion of initial court-ordered treatment, the
court may order extended commitment, or if ruled competent, may pro-
ceed with trial.169 The Code also permits the State to declare the men-
tally retarded offender incompetent, dismiss the charges against him, and
commit him to long-term institutional care.
170
158. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 304, 320-21 (2002) (explaining the possibility
that a mentally impaired defendant cannot raise a satisfactory defense).
159. See Kacie McCoy Daugherty, Comment, Synthetic Sanity: The Ethics and Legal-
ity of Using Psychotropic Medications to Render Death Row Inmates Competent for Execu-
tion, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 715, 718-19 (2001) (arguing that executing
incompetent persons does not deter others).
160. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
161. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 46B (Vernon 2005).
162. Id. at art. 46B.004.
163. Id. at art. 46B.051.
164. Id. at art. 46B.051(c).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
166. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 46B.007 (Vernon 2005).
167. Id. at art. 46B.024(1), 46B.024(3).
168. Id. at art. 46B.073.
169. Id. at art. 46B.084.
170. Id. at art. 46B.151.
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C. Mental Retardation
Mental retardation does not absolve the offender; it exempts him from
the death penalty.171 Mental retardation, unlike the insanity defense or
incompetence, is not temporary. 17  The mentally retarded offender was
under the influence of his condition at the time of the act, just as he will
be at the time of his trial and punishment; therefore, the typical judicial
and clinical procedures and their motivations for restoration of compe-
tency do not apply.1 73 Similarly, just as insanity and incompetence moot
the retributive and deterrent effects of the death penalty, the calculus is
obviously the same for mentally retarded offenders, providing the basis
for Atkins to establish judicial recognition of the mentally retarded as a
class of offenders deserving of Eighth Amendment protection.1 7 4 Not all
mentally retarded offenders, however, must be held less culpable.
175
Among the three mental states treated by Texas law, mental retarda-
tion is the only defense based on a clinical diagnosis of mental defect.
17 6
The American Association for Mental Retardation ("AAMR") stipulates
that retardation is neither a medical disorder, nor a mental disorder, but
rather a "state of functioning" begun in childhood that "reflects the fit
between the capabilities of individuals and the structure and expectations
of their environment.' 77 The AAMR definition includes "significant
171. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (demonstrating mentally incompetent
persons, as opposed to insane persons, can be convicted of crimes, but not penalized with
death).
172. See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defend-
ants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 424-25 (1985) (explaining that significant consequences
for the criminal defendants and the justice system flow from the differences between retar-
dation and mental illness). Mental illness is often temporary, cyclical, or episodic, but
mental retardation is permanent. Id.
173. See Id. (noting that if competency restoration procedures are imposed on the
mentally retarded defendant, lifelong confinement may result); see, e.g., Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 361-70 (1983) (holding the Constitution permits the government to
confine an insanity acquittee to a mental health facility until he has regained sanity).
174. See Victor R. Scarano & Bryan A. Liang, Mental Retardation and Criminal Jus-
tice: Atkins, the Mentally Retarded and Psychiatric Methods for the Criminal Defense Attor-
ney, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 285, 287 (2004) (guiding defense counsel in
determining trial strategy for the mentally impaired offender).
175. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 317 (2004).
176. Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and
the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 334-35
(2002) (explaining that legislatures have relied heavily on modern definitions of mental
retardation in exempting mentally retarded persons from the death penalty).
177. See American Association for Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental Retar-
dation, http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq-mental-retardation.shtml (last visited Nov. 1,
2006) (explaining that individuals may be assessed in comparison with other persons of
their age and culture).
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limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills" with onset
before the age of eighteen. 171 The Texas Health and Safety Code reflects
the AAMR emphasis on behavioral adaptations: "'Mental retardation'
means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is
concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the
developmental period.,
179
The prevailing definitions of mental retardation agree that an IQ of
seventy signifies a likelihood of retardation.18 ° IQ is only one considera-
tion of mental retardation, and it should not be considered dispositive in
the criminal justice setting, as Ex parte Briseno instructed when it de-
clined to accept as gospel that a person who barely tips the scale of
clinical mental retardation should win exemption from the death pen-
alty.18' In recent years, the AAMR, as well as the American Psychiatric
Association, have amended their definitions of mental retardation to
178. See American Association for Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental Retar-
dation, http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq-mental-retardation.shtml (last visited Nov. 1,
2006) (describing the factors considered to diagnose mental retardation, including compre-
hensive lists of adaptive behavior skills and support behaviors considered by clinicians).
179. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 591.003(13) (Vernon 2005).
180. See Jonathan L. Bing, Note, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital Pun-
ishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 59, 67-68 (1996) (explaining that experts arrived at an IQ of seventy as a
flexible standard designed to allow persons with IQs above seventy with special needs to
be diagnosed with retardation, while excluding persons sub-seventy IQs if the comprehen-
sive psychological judgment did not indicate mental retardation); American Association
for Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental Retardation, http://www.aamr.org/Policies/
faq-mental-retardation.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (explaining that because the stan-
dard margin of error on most IQ tests is nearly five points, the upper range may climb to
an IQ of seventy-five).
181. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6-8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (refusing to en-
dorse a definition of mental impairment or mental retardation that exonerates a person
based solely or significantly on IQ). To further distance the measure of culpability from a
clinical score, the court proposed a list of objective questions to address the defendant's
connection to the crime:
-Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage-his family,
friends, teachers, employers, authorities-think he was mentally retarded at that time,
and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?
-Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct
impulsive?
-Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others?
-Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of
whether it is socially acceptable?
-Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or
do his responses wander from subject to subject?
-Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others' interests?
[Vol. 9:237
A PROPOSAL TO THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE
minimize the importance of IQ as a factor in diagnosis and emphasize
adaptive behavior.'1 2
D. The Trouble with Bright Lines
To illustrate why Texas legislators and courts may find it undesirable to
adopt a bright-line IQ number, consider the Supreme Court's holding in
Roper v. Simmons,'83 in which the Court determined that a person who
was under eighteen years old when he committed a capital murder could
not be executed.184 Roper overruled Stanford v. Kentucky,185 in which
the Court previously upheld the execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-
old murderers.1 8 6
-Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did
the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution
of purpose?
Id. at 8-9; see also Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Texas and the Mentally Retarded Capital Of-
fender, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 112 (2004) (noting that at the same time Ex parte
Briseno offered an objective set of questions, it announced it would grant "almost total
deference" to trial court factual findings upon collateral review (quoting Ex parte Briseno,
135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004))).
182. See Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital Punishment:
State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 59, 69 (1996) (explaining that the DSM-IV incorporated the AAMR's new, be-
havior-oriented definition into its own literature). Since 1908, the AAMR has amended
the way mental retardation is defined ten times. American Association for Mental Retar-
dation, Definition of Mental Retardation, http://www.aamr.org/Policies/
faq.mentalretardation.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
183. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
184. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the execution of persons who were under eighteen years old when
they committed a capital crime, based in part because "the evidence of national consensus
against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the evi-
dence [Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304] held sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus
against the death penalty for the mentally retarded"); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988) (holding by a plurality that the Eighth Amendment prohibited capital pun-
ishment when offender committed his crime before the age of sixteen, noting that thirty
states banned execution of fifteen year olds); see generally Brian W. Varland, Marking the
Progress of a Maturing Society: Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Death Penalty Appli-
cation in Light of Evolving Standards of Decency, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 311 (2005) (analyz-
ing the Court's emerging interest in reconsidering various applications of the death penalty
under its "evolving standards of decency" test).
185. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
186. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that execution of sixteen and
seventeen year olds did not violate evolving standards of decency and therefore did not
violate the Eighth Amendment). The Court handed down Stanford v. Kentucky in the




At the age of seventeen, Christopher Simmons told his friends he
wanted to murder someone.1 87 Soon thereafter he broke into a home,
bound and gagged the woman of the house while her husband was away,
and threw her from a bridge, where she drowned.188 Simmons told his
friends he was forced to kill her because she had saw his face. 189
In Roper, the Court again cited national consensus1 90 in support of its
decision that offenders at Simmons' age are less culpable for murder than
their eighteen-year-old accomplices. 191 In other words, a gunshot on ei-
ther side of the stroke of midnight could be the determining factor
whether a capital murderer gets life or death. Seventeen-year-old mur-
derers in Texas now enjoy blanket immunity, regardless of their adaptive
behaviors, level of maturity, or leadership abilities.192 Yet, a capital mur-
der defendant with an IQ of sixty-nine may or may not meet the require-
ments for a diagnosis of mental retardation. 93
187. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
188. Id. at 556-57.
189. Id. at 557; see also Interview with Lee Hon, Polk County Assistant Dist. Attor-
ney, in Livingston, Tex. (Oct. 6, 2005). Prosecutor Lee Hon reported that Penry confessed
to killing his victim so that she could not identify him. Id.
190. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002). But see Robin M. A. Weeks,
Note, Comparing Children to the Mentally Retarded: How the Decision in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia Will Affect the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 17 BYU J. PuB. L. 451, 478-79 (2003)
(asking whether the Court would reverse its bans on capital punishment based on national
consensus if the national consensus dissolved or shifted).
191. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 599-600 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (writing that an espe-
cially depraved seventeen year old murderer may be just as culpable as many adult offend-
ers who merit the death penalty, thus "[i]t follows that a legislature may reasonably
conclude that at least some 17-year-olds can act with sufficient moral culpability, and can
be sufficiently deterred by the threat of execution, that capital punishment may be war-
ranted in an appropriate case").
192. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 2005) (amending the penal code to
raise the minimum age of eligibility for the death penalty from seventeen to eighteen years
of age). It is interesting to note that Tex. S.B. 60 as initially drafted provided a vehicle for
the creation of a statutory life-without-parole alternative to the death penalty. Id. as filed
Nov. 8, 2004. The Court handed down Roper v. Simmons during the legislative session and
the legislature responded swiftly, adopting Rep. Harold Dutton's amendment to comply
with Roper on May 24, 2005. http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/data/docmodel/79r/amndtext/
pdf/SB00060225.pdf. In the time since the Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, the Texas leg-
islature has convened in two 150-day regular sessions (in 2003 and 2005) and six special
sessions. Texas Legislature Online History, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us.
193. See Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital Punishment:
State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 59, 67-68 (1996) (explaining that experts arrived at an IQ of seventy as a flexible
standard designed to allow persons with IQs above seventy with special needs to be diag-
nosed with retardation, while excluding persons sub-seventy IQs if the comprehensive psy-
chological judgment did not indicate mental retardation); American Association for
Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental Retardation, http://www.aamr.org/Policies/
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E. The Texas Proposals
Texas legislators in 2005 took even less official notice of the issue than
in recent years.194 Previous sessions witnessed more activity on the sub-
ject, and interest has declined. In 2001, prior to Atkins, Governor Rick
Perry vetoed a bill that would have permitted the defense to evade a
jury's death sentence by convincing two experts and the trial judge that
the jury verdict was erroneous as to the defendant's mental
retardation.
195
In 2003, a bill that would have made mental retardation a mitigating
issue for consideration by the jury in the penalty phase passed the Texas
House, but did not receive favorable treatment in the Senate.19 6 Drafted
by the Texas District and County Attorney's Association (TDCAA), the
bill would have required the court to submit the question as a separate
special issue during the punishment phase.1 97 TDCAA believes that
mental retardation should be treated as a "punishment issue" to be re-
solved by the jury during the consideration of the special issues.1 98 Be-
cause the mentally retarded remain eligible for prosecution and
faq.mentalretardation.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (explaining that because the stan-
dard margin of error on most IQ tests is nearly five points, the upper range may climb to
an IQ of seventy-five).
194. See Tex. H.B. 419, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (proposing a unique mental retardation
mitigation instruction in the penalty phase). Authored by House Criminal Jurisprudence
Chairman Representative Terry Keel, the bill was referred to that committee on Feb. 3,
2005, never to be heard from again. Texas Legislature Online, http://
www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2006). Senator Todd Staples sponsored com-
panion legislation in the Senate in the form of Tex. S.B. 65, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005). Id.; Tex.
S.B. 231, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (proposing a pretrial determination of mental retardation
in conformity with existing statutes for pretrial determination of other constitutionally pro-
tected classes of mental impairments). Authored by Senator Rodney Ellis, this bill, too,
was forgotten in the Senate Criminal Justice Committee. Texas Legislature Online, http://
www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2005). Senator Eliot Shapleigh, Leticia Van De
Putte, and Mario Gallegos signed on as co-authors. Id.
195. See Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (rejecting
an interlocutory procedure that would have permitted a judge to reverse a jury's determi-
nation of retardation based on the opinion of experts not connected with the trial).
196. See Tex. H.B. 614, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (proposing a unique mental retardation
mitigation instruction in the penalty phase). The House of Representatives approved the
bill on April 30, 2003, but the Senate declined to assign it to committee or otherwise give it
consideration. Texas Legislature Online, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2005). It was reintroduced in 2005 as Tex. H.B. 419, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005). Id.
197. Email from Shannon Edmonds, Director of Governmental Relations, Texas Dis-
trict and County Attorneys Ass'n (Oct. 13, 2005 13:54:OOCST) (on file with author).
198. See Texas District and County Attorneys Association, Potential Jury Instructions
on Mental Retardation (unpublished communication to TDCAA membership) (on file




sentencing, TDCAA claims that an additional yes-or-no special issue
question could adequately determine whether the person was mentally
retarded and thus eligible for execution.1 99 TDCAA has concluded that
mental retardation may thus be distinguished from the pretrial legal de-
termination of competency to stand trial and insanity. 0°
TDCAA's proposal is problematic in light of the recent decision in
Penry v. Texas.2° ' The court held that the jury's negative finding of
mental retardation hindered its ability to properly distinguish and con-
sider the separate mitigating issue of mental impairment.20 2 The legisla-
ture may, of course, conclude that Texas House Bill No. 419 satisfactorily
separates the two questions.20 3 The risk, on the other hand, is that the
proximity of the separate issues of mental retardation and mental impair-
ment will continue to frustrate trial verdicts by raising questions of their
reliability or accuracy.20 4
A bill supporting pretrial litigation of the issue fared no better in the
most recent Texas legislature.20 5 Texas Senate Bill No. 231 mimicked ex-
isting Texas code related to competency and sanity hearings, including
procedures for consideration by the defendant's choice of pretrial
199. See id. (asserting that special issue question on mental retardation satisfies the
requirement of Atkins).
200. See id. (making distinction between mental retardation issue and pretrial deter-
minations of incompetence and insanity).
201. See Penry III, 178 S.W.3d at 788 (holding that mitigation instruction on mental
retardation reasonably could have precluded jurors from considering relevant mitigating
evidence of mental impairment). But see Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Rea-
soning: Capital Punishment and the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson,
35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 367 (2002) (concluding that separate penalty phase instructions on
mental retardation and mitigating circumstances provide the jury with the opportunity to
make a reasoned moral response).
202. See Penry I1, 178 S.W.3d at 788 (holding that mitigation instruction on mental
retardation reasonably could have precluded jurors from considering relevant mitigating
evidence of mental impairment).
203. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 (1988) (holding states free to structure
and shape consideration of mitigating evidence "in an effort to achieve a more rational and
equitable administration of the death penalty").
204. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. at 380 (1990) ("[T]he proper inquiry in such a
case is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction[s] in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evi-
dence."); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offend-
ers and Excluding them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 112-13 (2003) (suggesting that
states relying on sentencing phase determinations of mental retardation face the possibility
of challenge based on questions of reliability and accuracy).
205. Tex. S.B. 231, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (proposing a pretrial determination of
mental retardation in conformity with existing statutes for pretrial determination of other
constitutionally protected classes of mental impairments).
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factfinder.20 6 The finding would be subject to appeal, and a negative find-
ing would not preclude the defendant from introducing evidence of
mental retardation at his sentencing.2 °7 A demonstrated IQ of seventy or
below would create a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation. 0 8
Under Texas Senate Bill No. 231, the defendant would bear the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.20 9
V. CLOSING ARGUMENT FOR LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE
A. The Legislature Must Make the Law for Texas
The law of the land is clear: execution of the mentally retarded consti-
tutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment.210
While the Constitution clearly presupposes the death penalty,211 the Con-
stitution also limits it's application.212 The Texas legislature, in turn, must
express its will regarding adjudication of mental retardation claims in
Texas.2 13 Its continuing reticence to make a determination on the issue
leaves district courts without statutory guidance.214 Federal courts con-
sidering habeas corpus petitions from the state's death row also depend
on state statutes. 215 Notwithstanding the failure of the court's special-
issue jury instruction in Penry v. Texas, the legislature has broad discre-





210. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring citizens shall not be "deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process") (emphasis added).
212. But see Daniel Nickel, Constitutional Law: Retarded Justice: The Supreme Court's
Subjective Standards for Capital Punishment of the Mentally Retarded, 56 OKLA. L. REV.
879, 926 (2003) (criticizing the Atkins decision's determination that execution of the mildly
mentally retarded could be construed as cruel and unusual punishment, and accusing "the
Court of acting as a legislature for the people").
213. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 317 ("[W]e leave to the State[s] the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execu-
tion of sentences.") (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
214. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d1 at 4-5 (clarifying that it does not normally
make law, but that it must fill the legislature's void because "'justice delayed is justice
denied' to the inmate, to the victims and their families, and to society at large").
215. See, e.g., In re Woods, 155 F.App'x 132, 135-36 (5th Cir. 2005) (granting peti-
tioner permission to seek federal habeas relief from his Texas death sentence based on his
claim that he is mentally retarded and ineligible for execution under Atkins).
216. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 317 (anticipating disagreement among the
states regarding the substantive and procedural issues inherent in effecting the Court's
holding and thus ordering them to create their own solutions); Schriro v. Smith, 126 S. Ct.
7, 8 (2005) (affirming that the states must create their own procedures for ensuring that
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Perhaps the legislature believes that courts will continue to adjudicate
the claims of the mentally retarded by forcing the mentally retarded to
either allege insanity or incompetence in order to access statutory pretrial
procedures or simply rely on mitigating evidence. Johnny Paul Penry has
never persuaded a jury to find him mentally retarded or sufficiently men-
tally impaired to spare his life. The appellate courts have consistently
found Texas solutions to the issue to be legally impaired and unjust.
In his veto message to Texas House Bill No. 236, Governor Perry
wrote, "[w]e don't execute mentally retarded murderers today." '217 But
the mentally retarded offender is not necessarily insane at the commis-
sion of the offense; nor is he necessarily unable to assist counsel in his
own defense at trial and therefore incompetent.218 Existing Texas law
does not address the mentally retarded defendant in a constitutionally
adequate manner because insanity law and competence law do not ad-
dress the unique needs of those offenders. The mentally retarded defen-
dant in Texas, while ostensibly enjoying the protection of the Eighth
Amendment, is presently denied the equal protection of procedures de-
signed to benefit other classes of mentally impaired persons whose im-
pairments render them ineligible for Texas' ultimate penalty. 219
mentally retarded persons are not executed; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In this circumstance, the theory and utility of our
federalism are revealed, for the [s]tates may perform their role as laboratories for experi-
mentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear."); cf Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986) (leaving to the states the responsibility of creating
procedures to prohibit the execution of the insane).
217. See Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001), available
at www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/vetoe/77/hb236.pdf (declaring that adequate safeguards exist
in Texas to ensure that mentally retarded persons are not executed). The governor indi-
cated that existing procedures for determining insanity and incompetence, as well as the
provisions for mitigating circumstances, already protect the mentally retarded defendant.
Id.
218. See generally Denis W. Keyes, William J. Edwards & Timothy J. Derning, Miti-
gating Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the "Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 529, 537 (1998) (explaining that some mentally retarded
offenders may not receive the proper defense because either their attorneys do not under-
stand their defect or the courts apply incorrect procedures); Bryan A. Liang & Victor R.
Scarano, Mental Retardation and Criminal Justice: Atkins, the Mentally Retarded and Psy-
chiatric Methods for the Criminal Defense Attorney, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 285,
287 (2004) (suggesting strategies for attorneys defending mentally impaired defendants).
219. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offend-
ers and Excluding them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIs. 77, 112-13 (2003) (making the case
that mental retardation should be determined at the pretrial phase in order to determine
death penalty eligibility).
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B. A Proposal Based on Current Texas Practices
1. Mental Retardation Is More Than a Mitigating Issue
The legislature should avoid placing the defendant's mental retardation
issue in the punishment phase of a capital trial. Courts have found this
practice problematic in several states.22° The evidence the defense in-
troduces to prove mental retardation has been shown to influence the
jury's perception of future dangerousness. Death-penalty jurors spend
days or weeks in voir dire answering questions regarding whether they
have religious or moral objections to the death penalty.221 Jurors come to
believe that their primary task is not to determine guilt or innocence, but
whether to impose a life sentence or the death penalty on a convicted
murderer.222 With the guilt determined, jurors who have considered the
autopsy report, bloody photographs, and the testimony of the victim's
loved ones while the retarded defendant sat smiling or disinterested
223
will have a difficult time ruling favorably on a defendant's claim of a con-
stitutionally mandated legal exception to the death penalty.224 It is not
small or unsequential irony that Johnny Paul Penry lives today because
the Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held
repeatedly against the state's persistent failed attempts to shoehorn into
the jury instructions some iteration of the same mitigating issue question.
Texas House Bill No. 419 or another attempt to resolve the legal question
of constitutional exemption from the death penalty in a jury box filled
with autopsy photos will only compound the failure.225
220. See Penry II1, 178 S.W.3d at 785 (holding that jury instructions regarding differ-
ence between mental retardation and mental impairment led to confusion); New Mexico v.
Flores, 124 P.3d 1175, 1184-85 (N.M. App. 2005) (holding that the court, not the jury, must
make the determination of competency); Louisiana v. Turner, 936 So.2d 89, 103 (La. 2006)
(holding that a capital jury is not the proper guarantor of the mentally retarded defen-
dant's Constitutional exemption from the death penalty).
221. See Justice John Paul Stevens, Speech to the ABA Annual Meeting Chicago,
Aug. 6, 2005 http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html (speak-
ing candidly about his general opposition to the states' application of the death penalty).
222. See id. (describing the tedious process involved in selecting a death penalty jury,
and the normal result).
223. See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (characterization of mentally
incompetent defendants, such as Atkins, does not reasonate with jurors very well).
224. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 40-41, 51-52
(1987).
225. See Penry 1, 492 U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that
evidence of mental retardation is too easily outweighed by other factors regarding culpabil-
ity); Lisa Odom, Jumping on the Bandwagon: The United States Supreme Court Prohibits
the Execution of Mentally Retarded Persons in Atkins v. Virginia, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 875, 882
n.46 (2004) ("The problem is that the death penalty is reserved for only the most heinous
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2. Mental Retardation Is a Constitutional Question Suited to
Pretrial Determination
Atkins changed mental retardation from a mitigating circumstance to
be considered in the light of the other evidence as instructed by Texas'
sentencing procedure, to a determination of death penalty eligibility in
the same manner as competence or insanity.226 In light of Atkins, the
legislature should conform the determination of mental retardation to the
existing, proven procedures for findings of competency and insanity. This
would represent a logical continuation of the legislature's work in 2005, in
which it conformed the insanity defense framework to that of competency
determinations for the purpose of uniformity in procedure, 227 as well as
improvements in the qualifications and appointment of experts.228
This pretrial method properly permits the judge or pretrial jury to
weigh the legal issue of whether the defendant is constitutionally eligible
for the death penalty. Most states commit this question to a judicial de-
termination.229 If the defendant is mentally retarded, he is ineligible for
the death penalty.23° If the capital trial proceeds, the jury must then con-
sider as a fact question whether the state can execute the offender.231
The pretrial approach is far more likely to withstand constitutional
challenge.
Texas should also adopt into the Code of Criminal Procedure a defini-
tion of mental retardation that reflects the current advances in the field.
of crimes and therefore the judge or jury considers the mental retardation of the perpetra-
tor in light of the heinousness of the offense, which has an emotionally powerful effect.").
226. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offend-
ers and Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 112-13 (2003) (making the case
that mental retardation should be determined at the pretrial phase in order to determine
death penalty eligibility).
227. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 46C (Vernon 2006) (repealing TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. § 46.03 and establishing new procedures for the insanity defense, including qualifica-
tions for experts).
228. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 69 (1985) (holding that expert testimony
was crucial to defendant's insanity defense); see also James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson,
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 491 (1985) (explain-
ing that while Ake v. Oklahoma discussed only the insanity defense, a similar conclusion
could be reached on mental retardation). Due process would be denied by requiring a
mentally retarded defendant to assert his defense without the assistance of a competent
professional trained and experienced in the appropriate discipline. Id.
229. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offend-
ers and Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 112-13 (2003).
230. See James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 11-19 (2003) (sug-
gesting pretrial determination of mental retardation).
231. See id. (recommending jury question on mental retardation only after pretrial
determination is adverse to the defendant).
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By adopting a commonly accepted definition, the legislature would give
the courts access to the greatest number of experts already trained in the
field. Furthermore, by referring to the AAMR definition in Atkins, the
Court offered guidance as to the category of retarded persons about
whom there exists a national consensus.232 Texas should refrain from
adopting an IQ test as a rigorous measure of retardation. As Briseno
explained, IQ scores do not indicate culpability.233
3. Conclusion
The Texas legislature must prescribe an Atkins procedure. Round trips
between Texas' death row and the appellate courts would more likely
come to an end if the legislature would establish a pretrial determination
for mental retardation that separates the legal issue of death penalty eligi-
bility and the fact issue of mitigating circumstances. If the legislature
again delays proper legislation on this issue, more defendants and more
victims' families will have been denied the opportunity of justice, in
whichever form they seek it.
232. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offend-
ers and Excluding them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 112-113 (2003).
233. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3dl at 5-6 (reasoning that the diagnosis of "mild
mental retardation" is intended to cast a wide net around a class of persons too broad to
have been intended in the national consensus described by Atkins).
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